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Abstract
Research in the discipline of International Relations (IR) has been dominated by 
positivism. Positivist philosophy of science has been useful in the conduct of inquiry but 
it has come at a cost: Cartesian anxiety. That is, the pursuit of absolute certainty, with the 
demanding assumptions such an ambitious goal entails. In light of these questionable 
standards, pragmatism is presented as a promising alternative. A pragmatist approach 
rejects the search for ‘truth’ and instead proposes a focus on ‘warranted assertibility’. 
As such, it takes the preliminary character of knowledge seriously. Consequently, it 
is argued that pragmatism can address the shortcomings posed by positivism. By so 
doing, this exercise makes a call for pluralism, not a new orthodoxy. 
Key words: 
Positivism, Pragmatism, International Relations, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science.
Resumen 
La investigación en la disciplina de las Relaciones Internacionales ha estado dominada 
por el positivismo. La filosofía de la ciencia positivista ha sido útil para la investigación 
pero ha tenido un costo: la ansiedad cartesiana. Es decir, la búsqueda de la certeza 
absoluta, con las exigentes asunciones que esto implica. A la luz de tan cuestionables 
estándares, se presenta al pragmatismo como una alternativa prometedora. Este 
acercamiento rechaza la búsqueda de la ‘verdad’ y en su lugar propone un enfoque 
en la ‘asertabilidad garantizada’. Por tanto, toma en serio el carácter preliminar del 
conocimiento. Consecuentemente, se arguye que el pragmatismo puede atender 
las limitaciones del positivismo. Al hacerlo, este ejercicio hace un llamado para el 
pluralismo, no para una nueva ortodoxia. 
Palabras clave: 
Positivismo, pragmatismo, relaciones internacionales, epistemología, filosofía de la 
ciencia. 
Resumo
A investigação na disciplina das Relações Internacionais tem sido dominada pelo 
positivismo. A Filosofia da ciência positivista tem sido útil para a investigação, mas tem 
tido também um custo: a ansiedade cartesiana. Isto é, a procura da certeza absoluta, 
com as exigentes suposições que isso implica. À luz de tão questionáveis padrões, o 
pragmatismo apresenta-se como uma alternativa promissora. Esta abordagem rejeita 
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a procura da “verdade”, e em vez disso, ela propõe se focalizar na “assertividade 
garantida”. Por conseguinte, ela leva a sério a natureza preliminar do conhecimento. 
Consequentemente, argumenta-se que o pragmatismo pode encarar as limitações do 
positivismo. Ao fazê-lo, este exercício faz um chamado ao pluralismo, e não a uma nova 
ortodoxia.
Palavras-chave:
Positivismo, pragmatismo, relações internacionais, epistemologia, filosofia da ciência.
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Introduction
International Relations (IR) research has been dominated by an approach: 
positivism. To be sure, this is actually a reflection of the state of the social sciences 
in general (Jackson, 2011) that, given the notable success of the natural sciences, 
have sought to emulate them. Thus, efforts have been directed to the unveiling 
of the truths of the social world, the discovery of the universal laws of society (à 
la Comte). In the last decades, however, debates within IR have sprung up that 
question, to a large extent, the pertinence of that dominance. 
Positivism is a product of the Enlightenment’s goal to (almost literally) 
shed light on the world by dint of reason and the sciences. In this endeavour, it 
becomes a complex mixture of philosophical traditions that are combined not 
without tensions. It inherits modern philosophy’s quest for absolute certainty as 
the only grounds on which a claim to knowledge can be accepted (Bacon, 2012). 
As such, this position entails rather demanding requirements from research. So 
much so that the literature has called this “Cartesian anxiety” (Bernstein, 1983). 
In fact, those requirements have been criticized and even regarded as 
unrealistic by some camps. One such perspective is put forward by pragmatism, 
a philosophical tradition that directly tackles positivism and rejects it from its 
foundations1. Above and beyond a critique, pragmatism offers an alternative to 
the conduct of inquiry that takes the preliminary nature of knowledge seriously. 
It embraces fallibilism while committing to anti-scepticism (Bacon, 2012). 
In this context, an exploration of the underpinnings of each seems warranted. 
Consequently, this paper presents a discussion from the philosophy of science. 
With that purpose, it first introduces positivism. The discussion explores its 
roots, logic, limitations and requirements of this approach in order to hint to 
the implications it has for the conduct of research in International Relations. 
Then, it presents pragmatism as an alternative to positivism. It seeks to show that 
pragmatism can address the shortcomings of positivism and, by so doing, it can 
liberate inquiry from restrictions that could hardly be met, if at all. It argues that a 




argument	set	 forth	here	seeks	 to,	however	briefly,	 contribute	 to	 that	body	of	 literature	by	
contrasting	the	convention	and	the	alternative,	by	building	on	those	insights.
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making every choice transparent and thereby securing consistency in inquiry. The 
final section presents some concluding remarks of this exercise that ultimately is 
a call for pluralism.
A (brief) Philosophy of International 
Relations
An analysis of the conduct of inquiry in International Relations requires a discus-
sion of its foundations. Therefore, this section studies the philosophical grounds 
on which positivism, the conventional approach to research in the discipline, is 
built. Given that positivism has been dominant on the social sciences in general, 
the discussion confers the latter as well as topics specific to IR. This approach 
seeks to provide an accurate understanding of the implications of this framework 
by encompassing both breadth and depth. 
The philosophy of the social sciences is closely related to the philosophy of the 
natural sciences2. The Enlightenment is of particular interest as it showed that 
the mysteries of the physical world can effectively be uncovered by the rigorous 
use of the scientific method and the expectation was that it could do the same 
for the social world. This project was best undertaken by positivism, which has 
virtually dominated the conduct of inquiry in the social sciences (Jackson, 2011). 
Perhaps the epitome of this influence is economics. Cochran (2002) asserts that 
“[i]n subjects like economics, the desire to achieve a similar control over the 
social world has led to the entrenchment of positivism as an almost unquestioned 
epistemological and methodological orthodoxy” (p. 525). Positivism has proven 
quite useful in economics, prompting other disciplines such as political science 
and international relations to adopt it almost uncritically (Jackson, 2011). 
2	 The	philosophy	of	(social)	science	can	arguably	be	traced	back	at	least	to	the	Greeks.	It	could	
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Positivism’s main influences:  
Descartes, Hume and Comte
Positivism, as it is known today, is perhaps mostly associated with August 
Comte’s proposal in a General View of Positivism. Nevertheless, his work, as that 
of positivists before and after him, with its assumptions of an external world ruled 
by universal laws and how this extends to the study of society (Comte, 2009), is 
better understood in the wider context of historical events and traditions. Thus, 
positivism appears as the product of a rather large and sometimes conflicting 
history of ideas. In this sense, two main traditions are combined, not without 
tensions, to form what is known as positivism nowadays: Descartes’ and Hume’s 
thought (Kaboub, 2008; Rosenberg, 1993) i.e. rationalism and empiricism, 
respectively. 
The intellectual climate in which these traditions emerged is generated by the 
‘new sciences’ during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The new sciences 
challenged the worldview advanced by the Scholastics, who sought to find 
convergence between Christianity and classical philosophy, in an effort to argue 
that there was structure and purpose to nature (Bacon, 2012). The new sciences, 
under the notorious influence of Newtonian physics, opposed this view, in favor 
of generation of scientific (genuine) knowledge, exemplified by the search of 
immutable laws. It is in this context that Descartes sought to aid the new sciences 
in their enterprise.
Descartes represents rationalism. In his philosophy, he establishes at least three 
interrelated themes that have transcended until contemporary research, namely: 
i) the primacy of the mind; ii) absolute certainty (or absolute doubt); and, iii) 
deduction. First, he subscribes to mind-body dualism3, a metaphysical stance that 
posits that mind and body are two different substances. According to Descartes 
(1993), the mind was unextended and immaterial but thinking substance, the 
body, in turn, was exactly the opposite. Moreover, while the body was subject 
to mechanical laws, the mind was not (Descartes, 1993). As such, he sought to 
clearly differentiate between the mind from the body so as not to ascribe mental 
properties to the latter. This position is also, and usefully, referred to as mind-world 
dualism, in order to emphasize the separation that Descartes establishes between 
3	 	Throughout	this	paper	this	is	also	referred	to	as	mind-world dualism in order to emphasize 
the	 fact	 that	by	 isolating	 the	mind	 from	the	world	 in	which	 the	physical	body	 is	 included,	
Descartes argues in favor of a mind-independent world (see Jackson 2011).
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the mind and an external mind independent world (see Jackson, 2011). Second, 
contrary to the tradition that knowledge comes from sensation, Descartes argued 
that the senses can deceive and mislead, thus, knowledge derived from sensation is 
at most probabilistic and as such doubtful, making the senses an unreliable source 
for knowledge (Descartes 1993). Therefore, he favored the absolute certainty 
(Quinton, 2010) to be found in the ideas perceived by the mind alone via the 
method of absolute doubt (arriving eventually to cogito, ergo sum [Descartes 
1956]). Finally, Descartes favored the use of mechanistic principles. As such, 
he rejected the use of substantial forms, and their concomitant final causes, as 
explanatory principles in physics. Instead, he posits that clearer and more useful 
explanations can be obtained from deductions derived from universal laws. The 
implication for philosophy was that its task became the provision of foundations 
for knowledge in the form of ‘basic beliefs’ (Bacon, 2012).
Hume, on the other hand, argues for a different (although similar in certain 
respects) view, which highlights three elements: the primacy of experience, the 
division of knowable propositions, and causality and induction. First, as an 
empiricist, Hume believes that the scope, limits and justification of all knowledge 
are not given by the mind but by experience (Rosenberg, 1993). By experience 
it meant both sense perception and introspective awareness of one’s own state 
of mind (Dicker, 1998). Regarding the second, he asserts that an exhaustive 
typology of the objects inquiry can be divided into ‘relations of ideas’ and ‘matters 
of fact’. The former encompasses the sciences such as Arithmetic and Geometry, 
and every statement that can be intuitively or demonstratively certain (Dicker, 
1998). Matters of fact, in turn, are those objects of human reason that seem to 
correspond with reality (Dicker, 1998). Finally, Hume focused on the study of 
causation. However, he argues that inductive inferences (inferences from past 
experience, that the future will resemble the past) cannot be logically justified. 
However, given that in fact human beings rely on inductive reasoning and that 
most natural sciences rests on the belief that nature will not change, he recognizes 
it is indispensable for both purposive action and scientific inquiry (Dicker, 1998).
As can be gathered from the, necessarily simplistic but arguably sufficient, 
discussion above, in the effort of establishing what constitutes knowledge claims, 
there is convergence as well as conflict between Cartesian and Humean thought. 
The main common ground is their philosophical ontological position, the 
relationship of humans with the world. Both scholars adhere to the view that 
there is a ‘world out there’, i.e. mind independent world (Jackson, 2011). The 
implication being that truth or knowledge is that which reflects that external world 
as it is. The main difference between Descartes and Hume is epistemological, the 
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manner in which humans can know that world. In seeking to bridge the gap 
between the mind and the world while Descartes chose the mind, Hume stayed 
with the senses. 
Despite this tension, by late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries positivism 
gained currency as an approach to provide genuine knowledge characterized by 
mind-world dualism and empiricism4. As such, its influence extended over the 
social sciences as well5.
Contemporary positivism: logical 
positivism and logical empiricism
Arguably, the most important version of early positivism has been logical positi-
vism, a philosophy put forward by the Vienna Circle6 in the 1920s. The logical 
positivist program, as an epistemology, sought to establish what could be conside-
red knowledge. The explicit purpose of logical positivism was to make philosophy 
rigorous and scientific, beyond any previous effort (Waugh & Ariew, 2008). It 
differed from older versions of positivism because of its focus on “logical analysis 
of the statements and concepts of empirical science” (Carnap quoted in Waugh 
& Ariew, 2008, p. 18) for the clarification of problems and assertions (Caldwell, 
1994). 
The logical positivist proposal turns around the idea of meaningfulness (or 
cognitive significance). Only cognitively meaningful statements warranted 
scientific scrutiny and the status of knowledge claims (Uebel, 2014) and these 
statements could only be either analytic or synthetic (Caldwell, 1994). Analytic 
were those statements that are tautologies and self-contradictions or those 
statements that are ‘true simply because of their meaning’ (Putnam, 2002). That 




and	predict	 the	 social	world	 just	 as	 the	natural	 one,	 seemed	 to	be	 fulfilled.	 It	 offered	 the	
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is, they were justifiable by a priori reasoning (Uebel, 2014). Synthetic –non-
analytic truths– were those factual statements that can be verified by evidence 
(Caldwell, 1994). As such, they were justifiably only a posteriori (Uebel, 2014). 
For logical positivists, mathematics consists of analytic truths and synthetic truths 
were those that reflected the empirical world7. As Hahn, Neurath & Carnap 
(quoted in Caldwell, 1994) assert:
We have characterized the scientific world-conception essentially by two features. 
First it is empiricist and positivist: there is knowledge only from experience, which 
rests on what is immediately given. This sets the limits for the context of legitima-
te science. Second, the scientific world- conception is marked by the application 
of a certain method, namely logical analysis. The aim of scientific effort is to reach 
the goal, unified science, by applying logical analysis to the empirical material. (p. 
13; emphasis in the original) 
This program focused on objectivity and in so doing it established a dichotomy 
between facts and values. The former were objective, the latter were not. Indeed, 
themes previously regarded as philosophical, namely metaphysics, ethics and 
aesthetics, were deemed meaningless because they either cannot be translated 
into logically correct form or there are no empirical grounds to establish their 
truth or falsity (Waugh & Ariew, 2008). Further, this focus on factuality can be 
observed in the very differentiation of the empirical sciences (e.g. physics, social 
sciences) from the formal ones (e.g. mathematics), ascribing synthetic statements 
to the former and analytic to the latter, in an effort to “[…] renew empiricism 
by freeing it from the impossible task of grounding logical and mathematical 
knowledge” (Uebel, 2014, p. 90), as its factuality was not empirical but came 
from formal reasoning. 
Logical positivism’s focus on the empirical world shows its influence from 
the physical sciences. First, my mimicking the latter, logical positivists sought to 
provide certainty and objectivity to the social sciences. It could be argued that 
this stance was phenomenalist8 and some early logical positivists were (Caldwell, 
1994). Moreover, the stress on observability and the primacy of physical evidence 
7	 This	reflects	Hume’s	influence	in	positivism	by	borrowing	the	division	that	he	draws	regarding	
the	types	of	proposition	pertaining	human	reason.	See	previous	section.
8 Phenomenalism can be regarded as an extension of empiricism. While the latter focuses on 
the	sense,	phenomenalism	encompasses	‘experience’	broadly	conceived	in	order	to	account	
to	 inferences	 made	 by	 ‘mediated	 observation’,	 that	 is,	 observation	 aided	 by	 specialized	
instruments	(Jackson,	2011).	
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led logical positivist to assert the unity of science on methodological grounds, 
establishing thereby that both social and natural sciences are concerned with 
observable phenomena9 (Caldwell, 1994). 
Thus, with the aid of the new logic, logical analysis leads to a unified science. 
There are not different sciences with fundamentally different methods or different 
sources of knowledge, but only one science. All knowledge finds its place in this 
science and, indeed, is knowledge of basically the same kind; the appearance of 
fundamental differences between the sciences are the deceptive result of our using 
different sublanguages to express them. (Carnap quoted in Caldwell, 1994, p. 16; 
emphasis in the original)
Logical empiricism, close to the second half of the century, would iron out 
some of the rough edges in logical positivism10. The emphasis for logic empiricists 
was on determining when a non-analytic statement can be synthetic (and thereby 
a knowledge claim) or nonsensical. Traditionally, efforts in this regard had focused 
on the concept of testability or verifiability: a statement is meaningful if subject 
to empirical test. However, the Vienna Circle’s criterion of complete verifiability 
proved to be too strict since it rules out meaningless statements of universal 
form used for specifying general scientific laws11 (Caldwell, 1994). Hence, Karl 
Popper suggested instead the principle of falsifiability for distinguishing between 
scientific and non-scientific statements. That is, putting scientific systems to 
empirical negative tests, so as to try to refute them (Popper, 2002a). While this 
proposal solved the problem of verification it had shortcomings of its own for 
it failed to accept affirmative existential hypothesis as meaningful12 (Caldwell, 
1994). Consequently, another alternative was put forward by Carnap, with the 
notion of confirmation. In contrast to truth, an absolute concept that transcends 
9	 This	seems	to	coincide	with	Descartes’	approach	as	probably	best	expressed	in	his	tree	analogy.	









12 Ayer (1959) shows this best when he asserts that “[o]ne can say that there are no abominable 
snowmen,	for	this	could	be	falsified	by	finding	them;	but	one	cannot	say	that	there	are	abom-
inable	snowmen,	for	this	could	not	be	falsified;	the	fact	that	one	had	failed	to	find	any	would	
not prove conclusively that none existed” (p. 14).
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time, conformation is a relative one. The truth of a law cannot be verified, that is 
tested on all possible instances, but it can be confirmed on single instances and 
these tests allow the increasing confirmation of a law (Caldwell, 1994). 
In this context, towards the second half of the last century, Karl Popper 
becomes a figure with his critique of the logical empiricists. He insisted on 
falsifiability, rejected the inductive logic and argues a different growth of 
knowledge. According to Popper (2002a), scientific theories begin as bold 
conjectures and they attain the status of scientific if they pass severe critical tests, 
that is, if they are falsifiable13. Those theories that can be more severely tested, 
those that are more prohibitive, are regarded as having higher empirical content 
(Popper, 2002b). Those that survive repeated tests are considered corroborated. 
For Popper, content and probability vary inversely, thus corroborated theories are 
less probable. Consequently, refutation and corroboration, not confirmation of 
theories that have inductive probabilities, is the focus of science, and, importantly, 
is the way scientific knowledge grows (Popper, 2002a, 2002b). Popper’s view, 
resisted at first, came to be associated with positivism with time.
In the same vein, an additional contribution of logical empiricists is the attempt 
to describe all the types of explanation that occur in science. Both deductive 
and inductive logic (in an effort to address Hume’s problem of induction) are 
encompassed by the so-called covering laws14: the deductive-nomological and 
inductive-probabilistic models. The former shows the belief that the natural and 
social worlds are governed by universal laws and, thus, can be studied in the same 
way. The latter was an attempt to incorporate the increasing use of statistical laws 
(Caldwell, 1994). These were considered to exhaust the possible ways in which 
science is carried out, although the latter was subject to much critique. Thus, 
mainly the former came to be regarded as the scientific method, which separates 
science from non-science. 
Positivism, as an approach to inquiry searching for certainty, has grown and 
incorporated insights from different sources. As this brief discussion shows, some 
of its ideas are conflicting and of rather difficult resolution. Because of this it 





of explanans and explananda. 
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has been deeply criticized to the point that by the 1970s it was asserted that 
“[…] the positivistic program for philosophy of science has been repudiated by 
contemporary philosophy of science” (Suppe, 1977, p. 632).
Nevertheless, its hold on the social sciences has proven pervasive15. Indeed, the 
most fundamental philosophical tenets of positivism have endured resiliently and 
currently remain alive and kicking. One is ontological, the other epistemological, 
namely ontological realism and correspondence theory of truth. The former 
refers to what has been termed mind-world dualism, the assumption that there 
is a world ‘out there’ independent from human cognition. The latter is the 
epistemological position that the world can be known through experience and 
that truth (knowledge) is only statements that match or mirror that world. As 
such, in practice, the legacy of positivism in IR becomes rather evident16: 
1) belief in the unity of science; 2) commitment to a strict fact/value separation; 
3) belief in the existence of regularities in the social as well as the natural world 
that licenses deductive-nomological and inductive- statistical forms of covering 
law explanation; and 4) empirical validation, falsification, being viewed as proper 
inquiry. (Smith, 1996, p. 16)
Beyond Positivism: Pragmatism
Pragmatism originated in late nineteenth century in the United States. In the 
aftermath of the US American Civil War pragmatists were arguably influenced 
by distrust in absolutist ideas, such as those that fueled the war (Menand, 1997). 
Against this background, pragmatism was born as a theory of meaning concer-
ned exclusively with practical consequences. For Peirce (1905), the founder of 
pragmatism, the meaning of concepts is the practical effects of acting according 
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to them17. This approach has important bearing for the philosophy of science. Ac-
cording to Peirce, the pursuit of Cartesian ‘basic beliefs’, immediate foundations 
of knowledge or universal laws –the pursuit of absolute certainty– is nonsensical, 
as there is no ‘intuitive’ knowledge, knowledge that is given directly and imme-
diately to the mind. Knowledge is inferential; knowledge presupposes interaction 
with the external world (Bacon, 2012). 
These core ideas have been further elaborated by other pragmatists. Albeit, 
as it is often the case in philosophy, it is rather difficult to encompass different 
thinkers under one label18, the following discussion on pragmatism focuses 
mainly, though not exclusively, in the contributions of the classical pragmatists as 
their contribution seems more relevant for the purposes of this paper.
Neither ‘mind’ nor ‘things’ but acting
Pragmatism overcomes the limitations of empiricism and rationalism, and the 
tensions of combining them. At its most basic level, it departs from ‘acting’, 
not from ‘things’ or form ‘reason’ or thought, thereby preventing false starts 
(Kratochwil, 2011). Pragmatism rejects the view of inquiry as a mind passively 
receiving knowledge from a world that is unveiled to it, as if truth corresponds 
to reality. Dewey called this ‘spectator theory of knowledge’ (Bacon, 2012). 
Instead, it opts for a naturalistic approach, influenced by Darwin, in which it sees 
the generation of knowledge as the process of interaction between the human 
organism and its environment (Dewey, 1985). Therefore, it regards inquiry as the 
process by which humans engage with their environment, through manipulation 
and testing of hypotheses, so as to solve an obstacle until they are able to further 
human action again. In this sense, it seeks to take seriously actual research 
practices and human cognition. The aspiration of pragmatism has been described 
17	 The	pragmatic	maxim	proposed	by	Peirce	 (1905)	 stated:	 “Consider	what	 effects	 that	might	
conceivably	have	practical	bearings	you	conceive	the	object	of	your	conception	to	have.	Then	







18 For a discussion on different pragmatist and their contribution to this philosophical tradition 
see	Bacon	(2012),	Misak	(2007,	2013),	Menand	(1997),	Talisse	&	Aikin	(2011).
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as “[…] a philosophy that is at once naturalist and humanist, a philosophy that 
fully respects the modern scientific worldview without thereby losing contact 
with the world of human experience” (Talisee & Aikin, 2011, p. 4). 
In this sense, pragmatism takes the preliminary character of scientific 
knowledge seriously. Pragmatists abandon the idea of universal laws in the 
social world. Dewey (1985) states that “[…] conceptions, theories and systems 
of thought […] are tools. As in the case of all tools, their value resides not in 
themselves but in their capacity to work shown in the consequences of their 
use” (p. 163). Once these tools can no longer fulfill their purpose, new ones 
are required. Thus, any ‘truth’19 established via pragmatist science settles a 
controversial or complex issue, or answers a particular question, for the time 
being, until something appears to disturb the settlement, forcing inquiry to start 
anew (Cochran, 2002). Furthermore, that something cannot be anything. Dewey 
(2008a) emphasizes that questioning presumptive knowledge requires reasons. 
Although the confidence placed on knowledge is provisional, such objects are 
considered settled until there is reason to doubt them.
The collapse of positivist dichotomies
Pragmatism addresses certain dichotomies established by positivism. For example, 
Quine (1980) shows that the logical positivist’s analytic-synthetic dichotomy does 
not hold because no statement is void of empirical content20. Further, Putnam 
(2002) addresses another of the most fundamental dichotomies of positivism, 
that between facts and values. For positivism science is the realm of fact because 
it is empirically verifiable, whereas areas such as ethics were unverifiable and thus 
the mere expression of preference (Bacon, 2012). According to Putnam (2002, p. 
145), this is “the last dogma of empiricism”.
However, facts and values are inextricably entangled. For classical pragmatists 
value and normativity are ubiquitous in all of experience (Putnam, 2002). This 
19	 Dewey	did	not	endorse	the	use	of	the	term	‘truth’	due	to	is	positivist	connotation,	although	
he	used	it	under	this	caveat.	Instead,	he	favored	“warranted	assertibility”	(Quinton,	2010)	to	
describe the state in which a hypothesis succeeds in turning an indeterminate situation (one 
in	which	 there	 is	 an	 issue	 to	 be	 resolved,	which	 prompts	 inquiry)	 into	 a	 determinate	 one	
(Bacon,	2012).
20	 Putnam	 (2002),	 along	 the	 same	 lines	 argues	 that	 the	 analytic-synthetic	 dichotomy	 is	 a	
distinction rather than a dichotomy.
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has important bearings for the practice of science itself. If ‘value’ is not equated 
with ‘ethics’, as though they were synonymous, it becomes clear that science 
presupposed values, ‘epistemic’ values. Putnam (2002) is emphatic: 
These pragmatist philosophers did not refer only to the kind of normative jud-
gments that we call “moral” or “ethical”; judgments of “coherence”, “simplicity,” 
“plausibility,” “reasonableness,” and of what Dirac famously called the beauty of 
a hypothesis, are all normative judgments in Charles Peirce’s sense, judgments of 
“what ought to be” in the case of reasoning. (p. 31)
Further, epistemic concepts such as those cited, Putnam (2002) claims, 
cannot be separated into factual and evaluative parts. Epistemic notions are thus 
inescapably normative, framed within a particular context of evaluation (Bacon, 
2012). 
Against ontological realism and 
correspondence theory of truth
More fundamentally, pragmatism rejects positivist ontology and epistemology. 
It rejects the stance of a world existing independent of the human observer and 
the concomitant correspondence theory of truth, which posits that the object 
known is unaffected by the knower (Cochran, 2002). The mind does not observe 
a world in itself but acts in the world and by so doing it changes it (James, 1977). 
Further, Kant demonstrated in his transcendental turn that the observed object 
is constituted by the observing subject (Jackson, 2011). Thus, observation of 
practical facts is not theory free but theoretical and pre-theoretical. This implies 
that the subject is implicated in the constitution of the object and therefore it 
is not possible to derive concepts directly ‘the world’ (or ‘the facts’). Thus, since 
there is no ‘world out there’, the categories used to understand it do not come 
from objects but from the mind (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009). 
Moreover, ontological realism fails for reasons specific to the social sciences. 
Unlike the physical world, the social one is not made out of objects. Social 
reality, as Weber emphasized, is constituted by intersubjective meaning and value 
relations (Friedichs & Kratochwil, 2009). Therefore, social knowledge is based on 
both explaining (erklären) and understanding (verstehen). 
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Positivist epistemology is related, to a large extent, to its ontology. Therefore, 
if ontological realism falls, so does correspondence theory of truth. Since it posits 
that knowledge claims are only those that mirror the world, truth is a property 
of the world (Kratochwil, 2007). However, as stated above, what is perceived as 
the world cannot be separated from the concepts and theories of the observer. 
This certainly does not deny the existence of a reality but it does stress that if 
the observed is constituted by the observer, there cannot be a test against it21 
(Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009). 
Additionally, in the case of the social sciences, correspondence theory of truth 
poses particular challenges. As the discussion in the previous section shows, the 
positivist quest for certainty establishes a binary logic: something either is or is 
not (Kratochwil, 2007), statements are true or false. This can hardly apply to the 
social sciences where yes or no answers are quite scarce. In fact, as Friedrichs & 
Kratochwil (2009, p. 705) point out, the category of undecidable questions, a 
category that supposedly cannot exist, is “embarrassingly large”. 
Epistemological instrumentalism and 
consensus theory of knowledge
A pragmatic alternative entails two elements: the acknowledgment of knowledge 
generation as a social activity and the purpose of research as the generation of useful 
knowledge (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009). Consequently, instead of ontological 
realism, pragmatism proposes epistemological instrumentalism and against corres-
pondence theory of truth, pragmatism proposes consensus theory of knowledge. 
Regarding epistemological instrumentalism22, as mentioned above pragmatism 
is problem oriented and, as such, is concerned with useful knowledge. This means, 
that research should serve a clear, explicit purpose, but not any purpose. Here the 
Friedrichs & Kratochvil’s (2009) caveat is relevant:
21	 The	practical	implication	being	that	the	positivist	method	of	hypothesis	testing	is	no	longer	
required	 as	 it	 only	makes	 sense	 if	 one	 subscribes	 to	mind-world	 dualism	 and	 empiricism	
(Jackson,	2011).
22	 This	 denomination	 reflects	 Dewey’s	 own	 preferences	 regarding	 his	 theory	 of	 knowledge,	
which	he	called	instrumentalism	(Quinton,	2010).
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Social scientific knowledge is not primarily knowledge for its own sake as in first 
philosophy, nor for the sake of money as in business, nor for the sake of beauty, nor 
for the sake of power, and so on. Its purpose is to enable orientation in the social 
world. Its utility consists in helping us to understand complex social phenomena 
and/or to explain observed social regularities. Its value can be assessed by looking 
at how it enables orientation in the social world, including the tractability of 
relevant social problems. (p. 706)
Apropos consensus theory of knowledge, the implication is twofold. First, 
pragmatism emphasizes the contingent nature of knowledge. The positivist quest 
for certainty and the approximation to the ‘truth’ is rejected. For Dewey, laws are 
not universal and immutable, solely waiting to be discovered (Cochran, 2002). 
Instead they are more or less useful generalizations that work in a certain situation 
until they are found faulty and the search for new ones begins again. 
Second, it recognizes that knowledge is socially produced (Quinton, 2010). 
Since knowledge generation is committed to the methods and standards shared 
by epistemic communities, this entails that knowledge claims are always put 
to their consideration and debate (Dewey, 2008b). It is these communities of 
practice who help define the problems and critically assess the results of research 
instead of simply lifting the veil of nature. But, as Friedrichs and Kratochwil 
(2009), state, this is not enough,
To avoid the risk of academic self-encapsulation, social scientific knowledge 
also needs to be externally evaluated. It should resonate with other academic 
disciplines, with the human “objects” of study, and with society at large. The more 
scholarly consensus is meaningful to such multiple constituencies, the more it 
warrants the exacting predicate of knowledge. (p. 706)
Thus, the critical element of the epistemological project is kept. Kant’s court, 
which he argues is reason itself (Jackson, 2011), is replaced by communities of 
scholars (Kratochwil, 2011). Each community provides its own tribunal and 
evaluates the appropriateness of its own practices and methods. Thus, instead 
of objectivity, pragmatism favors agreement23 (Rorty, 1979). Further, against 
positivism’s binary logic, in the social sciences, these communities often deal with 
23	 “For	pragmatists,	the	desire	for	objectivity	is	not	the	desire	to	escape	the	limitations	of	one’s	
community,	but	 simply	 the	desire	 for	 as	much	 intersubjective	agreement	as	possible,	 the	
desire	to	extend	the	reference	of	‘us’	as	far	as	we	can”	(Rorty	quoted	in	Talisse	&	Aikin,	2011,	
p. 4).
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difficult questions and assess the results of knowledge claims by weighting the 
evidence, instead of applying a dichotomous template.
Importantly, epistemological instrumentalism and consensus theory of 
knowledge should be conceived of as two sides of the same coin (Friedrichs 
& Kratochwil, 2009). On the instrumental side, pragmatism does not entail 
acceptance of anything that works. That is, it is not instrumentalism à la 
Friedman, approving anything that yields useful predictions (Kratochwil, 2011). 
The social nature of the generation of knowledge must necessarily be respected 
for knowledge claims to warrant such status. On the consensus side, pragmatism 
seeks to avoid the de facto manufacturing of agreement in specific circles. Thus, the 
purposive element of addressing a problem and the more demanding procedural 
requirements regarding the intersubjective and critical nature of knowledge need 
to be fulfilled (Kratochwil, 2007). 
Pragmatist International Relations
Consequently, pragmatism can free the potential for creativity and rigor, 
contributing thereby to the growth of knowledge. But this growth does not 
constitute only the incremental accumulation of knowledge within a self-correct 
dynamic between conjectures and refutations à la Popper. It is characterized by the 
paradigmatic revolutions (Kuhn, 1970). Scientific knowledge does not advance 
only by knowing ‘more’, coming closer to the truth, but knowing ‘different’. That 
is, scientific progress consists in formulating questions that could not even have 
been thought of before (Kratochwil, 2007). 
This approach can prove fruitful for different disciplines within the social 
sciences but it has particular implications for international relations. This is 
because the debate on the adequate way to conduct research in the discipline 
has been rather rich but inconclusive in the last decades (Jackson, 2011). In this 
context, it seems useful to provide a critical account of the dominant approach 
to inquiry and propose an alternative. This may help to shed some light on 
the discussion and, in fact, explain some of its inconclusiveness. Additionally, 
in practice, research in IR has not stopped because of this situation and the 
discussion above can provide insights as to why. This raises the question of how 
can positivism be so flawed and dominant at the same time. Apropos, Friedrichs 
& Kratochwil (2009) argue that much of the research in the field is pragmatist in 
essence but disguised as positivist ex post in order to comply with the conventional 
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standards, which are positivist. Hence, the inconclusiveness of the philosophical 
debate in IR as well as the continuing practice of research despite the latter may 
be the symptoms of the same illness; lack of plurality. It is simply futile to attempt 
to assess pragmatist inquiry with positivist parameters, which is also the case 
conversely. It is pointless to try to evaluate an (philosophical) ontological position 
from the point of view of another (Jackson, 2011). However, this seems exactly 
to be the case24 and goes to show the urgency for further exploration of plausible 
alternatives that enrich the conduct of inquiry. 
In this sense, the pragmatist approach to inquiry in International Relations 
may bring up a fallacy –that without the assumptions of positivism, and the quest 
for absolute certainty that derives from them, the alternative is complete relativism 
or even nihilism (Kratochwil, 2011). However, questioning the convention, as 
mentioned at the outset of this paper, should do the opposite: enhance awareness. 
It does not follow, that without universally valid timeless foundations, ‘anything 
goes’. Quite the contrary, in the absence of such unrealistic expectations, the call 
is to mindfully select alternative positions that permit furthering inquiry, in the 
social sciences in general and International Relations in particular, adequately. 
Conclusions
Aristotle, in the beginning of his Metaphysics, stated “All men by nature desire 
to know”. This points to a human quality of being inquisitive. The sciences are 
perhaps the best example of how humans have sought to answer their inquiries. 
Moreover, philosophers and other scholars have endeavored to establish the 
grounds on which those answers constitute ‘justified true belief ’ (knowledge). 
From the outset of modern philosophy, these efforts have mainly focused on the 
positivist tradition, which has become the dominant approach within the social 
sciences in general and international relations in particular. 
Certainly a step forward from Scholastic thought, positivism it not without 
limitations. Based on the successes of the natural sciences, positivism sought to 
translate Newtonian insights to the social socials, that is, unveiling of immutable 
24 Illustrated notably by the obsession with hypothesis testing in research carried out in 
IR	 schools.	 As	 mentioned	 above,	 such	 an	 approach	 can	 only	 make	 sense	 if	 the	 research	
subscribed	to	mind-world	dualism	and	empiricism.	And	whether	it	actually	can	subscribe	to	it,	
as	argued	above,	can	be	contested.
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timeless laws of society. This led to the pursuit of certainty, which, as has been 
argued above, entails rather demanding requirements for the conduct of inquiry in 
the social sciences. Of particular interest is the assumption of a mind-independent 
world which can be known, and the belief that only those statements which 
match it or mirror it are acceptable knowledge claims. That is, ontological realism 
and correspondence theory of truth.
Against this backdrop, this paper has presented pragmatism as an alternative 
that addresses positivist shortcomings. Pragmatism departs from acting, not 
from reason (the mind), or from things (the world). It proposes a naturalistic 
view of the generation of knowledge in which it is a product of the interaction 
between human beings and their environment to solve a problem in order to 
further human action. This knowledge is accepted until there are reasons not to. 
Therefore, it takes the preliminary character of knowledge seriously. The proposal 
for research in IR is epistemological instrumentalism and consensus theory of 
knowledge. 
In this sense, pragmatism provides a way to carry out research with greater 
awareness of theoretical assumptions and implications, and without positivism’s 
demanding requirements. It has been argued that absolute certainty is not the 
antidote for Cartesian anxiety. Instead, recognizing its limitations and looking 
for alternatives can more helpful. However, pragmatism is not to be regarded as 
a silver bullet for IR research. A final corollary of the discussion presented in this 
paper is to hint to the benefits of searching for alternatives to positivism. Rather 
than replacing positivism with a new orthodoxy, the call is for pluralism. There 
is much to gain from questioning the dominance of positivist methodology. 
Developing this line of research and positioning alternatives on the debate can 
prove a quite fruitful endeavor (see e.g. Jackson, 2011). If nothing else, at least it 
can contribute to the caution and transparency with which we approach research. 
This alone constitutes a step in the right direction for furthering research in 
International Relations.
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